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Abstract
The incomes  of workers  and capitalists  pertain to  different moments  of accumulation.  Wages are 
shares of capital outlays  sustaining production; profits are shares  of commodity  sales. If 
aggregate  demand and the  scale of productive undertakings  are shaped with a measure of 
mutual autonomy, the class  distribution of income and the  measure of economic  activity are 
jointly determined by the same processes.  In those settings  “wage-led growth” has  neither 
analytical nor policy purchase as associations  between wage shares  and levels  of output (or 
growth) are confounded consequences  of distinct effects  on each  measure of broader 
developments in the economy. A more appropriate dichotomy is  that between “investment-led” 
and “consumption-led” growth,  with  the former resulting in comparatively higher wage shares. 
After advancing and illustrating these points,  this  paper motivates  its  approach to class  income 
flows  and the role of demand--which draw  on the  Circuit of Capital--in relation to  the  equivalent 
Kaleckian approaches sustaining arguments for “wage-led growth”. 
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1 The discussion offered in this paper  arose from an ongoing conversation with  Duncan  Foley  concerning the  Circuit  of 
Capital  and its distinctive macroeconomic  purchase. The  paper  has also directly  benefitted from comments provided by 
Peter Skott and Jo Michell. The usual disclaimers apply. 
Now  are the wages of the weaver a  share of the cloth,  of the twenty  dollars,  of the 
product of his work? By  no means.  Long  before the cloth  is sold,  perhaps long before  it 
is fully  woven, the weaver  has received his wages. The capitalist, then, does not pay  his 
wages out  of the money  which  he will  obtain  from  the cloth, but out  of money  already 
on  hand....  It is possible that  the employer  found no purchasers at  all  for his cloth.  It  is 
possible that he did not  get  even  the amount  of the wages by  its sale. It  is possible that 
he sells it  very  profitably  in  proportion to the weaver’s wages. But  all that  does not 
concern  the weaver....  Wages,  therefore,  are not  a  share of the worker  in  the 
commodities produced by himself. 
--K Marx, Wage-Labour and Capital, Chapter 2. 
1. Introduction
The concept  of “wage-led growth”  has gained currency  among  heterodox  economists in  recent 
years.  Put  most  simply, it consists of the contention  that higher  consumption  propensities by  wage 
earners may  ensure that  higher  wage shares in  total income result  in  net  increases in  aggregate 
demand and in  higher  equilibrium  levels of output.  The growing popularity  of the concept  is 
perhaps not  surprising, as it  supports positive,  “common-sense”  arguments in  favour of  measures 
seeking  to reverse significant trends towards greater  levels of income inequality  and lower  real 
wages evident across a range of economies over the past thirty years. 
The fundamental  idea  behind “wage-led growth”  is not  new. 2 But  its contemporary  expressions are 
analytically  supported and motivated by  modern  under-consumptionist contributions. Plurally 
understood,  under-consumptionism  refers to a  wide range of appreciations of the centrality  of 
aggregate  demand in  shaping  the accumulation  of capital. Most  generally,  it follows from  the 
recognition  of the relative autonomy  under  capitalist  conditions of decisions to purchase 
commodities from  the decisions to produce them. Capitalist  reproduction  is thus subject  to 
recurrent  disruptions driven  or  manifested in  shortages of demand relative to produced 
commodities and acquired productive capacities.  Inasmuch  as this view  amounts to a  rejection  of 
Say’s Law over some time horizon, it enjoys broad support among heterodox currents.3 
Under-consumptionist  contributions take significant analytical steps beyond this first important 
insight. In their  most  comprehensive expressions,  fundamental features of the accumulation  of 
capital are understood to result  in systematic  demand shortages that  contribute to chronic 
tendencies towards crisis,  militarism  and war, or  to long-term  stagnation. In  different  ways, this is 
2
2 It is in fact old enough to have been dismissed by Marx, “It is purely a tautology to say that crises are caused by the 
scarcity of solvent consumers, or of a paying consumption.... If any commodities are unsaleable, it means that no solvent 
purchasers have been found for them.... But if one were to attempt to clothe this tautology with a semblance of a 
profounder justification by saying that the working class receive too small a portion of their own product, and the evil 
would be remedied by giving them a larger share of it, or raising their wages, we should reply that crises are precisely 
always preceded by a period in which wages rise generally and the working class actually get a larger share of the annual 
product intended for consumption. From the point of view of the advocates of ‘simple’(!) common sense, such a period 
should rather remove a crisis.” Marx (1893), 475-476.
3 Going back to Malthus, Marx, and of course Keynes and Kalecki. 
the broad structure of the arguments in Luxemburg’s (1913) “problem  of realisation”, the 
monopolistic capitalisms of Hobson (1902) and Baran  and Sweezy  (1966), and in  Steindl’s (1952) 
Kaleckian-inspired stagnationism.  Quite apart from  the theoretical and empirical merits of these 
contributions,  it  should be  recognised that  they  contained integrated theorisations of the secular 
development of capitalism, and of possible endogenous obstacles and contradictions it faces. 
Contemporary  contributions on “wage-led growth” have offered more partial discussions, seeking 
to establish  either  the analytical possibility  or  empirical  purchase of positive associations between 
the wage share of aggregate income and the level  of output  or  rate of growth.  In  this they  have been 
broadly  based on  Kalecki (1971) and Steindl  (1952). Dutt  (1984) offers an  early,  explicit 
formalisation  motivated by  arguments concerning the role  of income inequality  in  the stagnation  of 
the Indian  economy  since the mid-1960s.4 Del Monte (1975) and Rowthorn (1981)  independently 
developed akin  frameworks. 5  The broad outlines of these approaches are considered by  Taylor 
(1985), who integrates them into a broader stagnationist growth model.6 
But  the most  directly  influential contribution  to recent  arguments for  “wage-led growth” has been 
provided by  Marglin  and Bhaduri (1990). The paper sought  to defend the idea  of “wage-led growth” 
in  the face of the unravelling  of the post-War  “Golden Age”  of capitalism,  a  period of simultaneous 
high  growth  and rising  real wages in the US and Western Europe.  Their  basic argumentation  is 
straightforward. Whether  or  not  an economy  is following  a  “wage-led”  regime is an  empirical 
question. To the extent that  savings rates of capitalists exceed those of workers,  a  shift  in  the 
distribution of income in  favour  of wage earners will boost  demand.  As long  as this effect 
outweighs any  possible decreases in  investment arising  from  the redistribution  of income in  favour 
of wages,  its net  effect will  be greater  demand and higher  levels of output.  This simple idea has 
recently  animated and supported a  growing heterodox  literature on the possible existence of 
“wage-led growth” or “wage-led demand regimes”.7 
This paper  develops a  critique of the concept  of “wage-led growth” founded on  the Circuit-of-
Capital macroeconomic framework. 8  It  applies the deliberate consideration  of the outlay  structure 
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4  The argument  is Stendlian: Producers are oligopolistic and operate with permanent  excess capacity, capitalists have 
lower consumption propensities than workers, and investment  hinges positively  on capacity  utilisation rates, ensuring 
investment accelerator effects enhance the effect on output of greater wage shares in income.
5 See Lavoie (1995).
6 Incorporating explicit consideration of the evolution of prices and nominal wages in endogenously shaping cost mark 
ups and consequently the distribution of income. The relationship between the framework developed here and 
approaches highlighting the endogenous evolution of the real wage or rate of exploitation is taken up explicitly below. 
7 For good expositions of these arguments and comprehensive reviews of recent empirical work on “wage-led” demand 
regimes, see Stockhammer and Onaran (2012) and Onaran and Galanis (2012).
8 As formally codified by Foley (1982, 1986) on the bases provided by of Marx (1885).
or  monetary  circuits of capitalist reproduction  offered by  that  framework  to analysis of the 
relationship between demand, the level or  pace of economic activity, and the class distribution  of 
income.  The resulting  approach offers a new  perspective on  the determinants of the distribution  of 
aggregate  income,  and fundamentally  challenges the analytical and policy  purchase of “wage-led 
growth”.  It also embodies a  broad treatment of demand determination,  based on  the concept of 
turnover time,  that is distinct from  and analytically  broader  than the treatments based only  on 
rates of fixed-capital utilisation typically associated with “wage-led growth”.
The critique results from  the following  considerations. Contributions variously  motivating  “wage-
led growth”  suppose that output  is sold entirely  upon  production.  Most immediately,  this is at  odds 
with  the empirical evolution of inventories which, as shown  in figures 1  and 2  for  the US economy, 
exhibits important  cyclical  fluctuations as well as a  notable falling  trend over the past  twenty  years. 
While  abstraction from  such  developments may  assist the pursuit of many  analytical goals, it 
hampers inquiry  into the aggregate,  class distribution  of income. If sales follow  immediately  upon 
production,  wages and profits appear  as a  simple division  of total output.  In  such  settings,  the 
distribution of income is exhaustively given by the real wage and production techniques.
<Figures 1 and 2 Around Here>
In  contrast,  deliberate consideration of the structure of class outlays and revenues or  monetary 
circuits in  capitalist  accumulation  makes clear  that  wages and profits are not  a  sharing  of output. 
In  the Circuit  of Capital,  wage and profit  flows represent  fundamentally  different  moments of the 
process of accumulation.  Wages are part  of current capital outlays made by  enterprises as they 
decide to undertake production.  They  are thus conditioned by  the prospects of profits and the 
ability  of enterprises to finance undertakings. Profits are a  fraction  of sales,  corresponding to mark-
ups made possible by  the exploitation  of labour power. They  will  be funded by  current  demand of 
enterprises for non-labour  productive inputs,  and as such  also conditioned by  productive decisions. 
But  they  are additionally  conditioned by  the consumption  decisions of households of workers and 
capitalists.  The aggregate distribution of income between  wages and profits thus hinges on  the 
relationship between decisions to purchase and decisions to produce. Notably, this is the same 
relationship ensuring  that  aggregate demand will,  over some time horizons,  independently 
condition the level or pace of economic activity. 
This perspective poses critical consequences for  “wage-led growth”, which  can only  be defined in 
such  settings of demand determination. The concept hinges on  a  non-existent  causal relationship 
between  two quantities that  are jointly  determined by  the relative measure of aggregate demand 
and capital  outlays.  Associations between  income distribution  and the level or  pace of economic 
activity  are confounded, reflecting  only  the distinct  effect  of broader  developments on  each  one of 
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the two measures.  The direct,  mutual  dependence of the incomes of workers and capitalist 
enterprises on  their  obverse expenditures ensures the intuition  and many  of the mechanisms 
involved in “wage-led growth”  are vitiated. To give but one of the examples pursued below, even 
along  stable evolutions not only  is it  possible that  increases in  the real  wage fail  to boost  growth, 
but they  may  also result  in  lower  wage shares. Policy  interventions grounded on the concept  of 
“wage-led growth” may thus prove perversely self-defeating. 
These limitations clearly  beg  analytical and policy  alternatives.  Analytically,  the relationship 
between  output (or  rate of growth) and income distribution  needs to be explicitly  understood as 
confounded.  While not  conducive to the causal arguments based on  “wage-led growth”, this may 
result  in  the identification  of changes in an economy’s parameters that  simultaneously  boost  levels 
or  paces of economic  activity  and the wage share of aggregate income. Such an  approach  may  help 
support  positive policy  arguments for  measures and outcomes favourable to wage earners,  without 
the analytical problems of “wage-led growth”. 
More broadly, the paper’s discussion  suggests that  evolutions in  which  demand is supported by 
sustained,  higher  relative levels of investment  will exhibit  higher  wage shares than otherwise 
comparable evolutions. Conversely, economies with  comparably  higher  measures of aggregate 
demand relative to capital  outlays will  evolve with  higher  profit  shares than  otherwise comparable 
economies.  As such  the paper suggests recent  consumption-led growth  strategies pursued in  the 
US, Britain,  and a  range of upper middle-income countries may  have directly  contributed to rising 
income inequality, over  and above the effects of falling  or  stagnant  real  wages in  many  of those 
economies.  Policy  interventions may  be formulated and advanced with  reference to alternative, 
investment-led growth paths, which will generally result in comparably higher wage shares. 
The paper  develops,  illustrates,  and analytically  situates these points as follows. Section two 
summarises the reference, comparative-static approach  to distribution  and output  as summarised 
by  Bhaduri (2009).  The section  contrasts to that approach  an  analogous Marxian  framework of 
demand determination  in  the class distribution  of income is endogenously  shaped by  the real wage, 
capital outlays, and aggregate demand. The following two sections develop and illustrate some of 
the consequences of the resulting  approach with  comparative-static exercises considering  the 
impact  on  output and income distribution  of changes to or  shifts in  the real wage, capital outlays, 
and consumption by  workers.  Their  findings help motivate not  only  the problems with  “wage-led 
growth”, but also the analytical and policy purchase of arguments for investment-led growth.
Section five illustrates the paper’s central points with  reference to exponential-trend or  steady-
state evolutions in a  generic dynamic macroeconomic model.  On  those bases it  offers an  alternative 
taxonomy  concerning the relationship between  demand,  growth, and distribution, founded on  the 
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identification  of comparative-dynamic movements in  the model’s parameter  space that yield 
positive associations between  wage shares and trend rates of growth.  Section  six concludes by 
situating  and motivating the distinctive analytical  purchase of the paper’s approach  to income 
flows,  distribution, and demand determination in  relation  to the equivalent  approaches in  the 
Kaleckian contributions analytically  sustaining  arguments in  favour  for  “wage-led growth”. The 
section  also motivates the particular  pertinence of the mechanisms it  highlights for  analysis of 
contemporary  economies; particularly  those in  which  “consumption-led growth”  strategies have in 
effect been pursued in recent decades. 
2. Two Different Approaches to Distribution
The most  effective, summary  statement  of the mechanisms behind “wage-led”  and “profit-led” 
growth  was recently  put  forward by  Badhuri (2009), based on  the earlier  influential  contribution  of 
Marglin  and Badhuri  (1990). 9 It  is derived easily  from  the standard income-expenditure identity. 
All  outlays are conceived statically, or  during  time lapses brief enough  to ensure stocks and the 
economy’s productive capacities do not  change. As such,  outlays may  only  be understood to hinge 
on  other  expenditure flows or  parameters. Normalising  the income-expenditure relation  to the 
unchanging level of capacity output yields the income identity,
 y = dw[! ]+ dc[" ]+ I[y,h]           (1)
Where dw[! ] denotes workers’ consumption  as a  function  of wages,  dc[! ] denotes capitalist 
consumption as a  function of profits, and I[y,h] is the investment function. The aggregate 
distribution of income is taken  as exogenous, with  the parameter  h measuring  the profit share of 
total income,  ensuring profits and wages are given  respectively  by  ! = hy, and ! = 1" h( )y. Total 
differentiation of (1) yields the slope of the IS curve, 10
dy
dh =
Ih[y,h]! y d"w[" ]! d#c[# ]( )
1! d"w[" ] 1! h( ) ! d#c[# ]h( ) ! Iy[y,h]
        (2)
Note that  the denominator  in  (2) consists,  respectively,  of the marginal impact  of increased income 
on  savings and on  investment. Ruling out  unstable income-multiplier  regimes, this denominator 
6
9 A more general framing of the possibility for “wage-led” or “profit-led” regimes is offered by Nikiforos and Foley (2012), 
which allow for endogenous co-determination of wage shares and capacity utilisation. 
10 Using the convention that for any variables xa and y,  xia  and yi denote the derivatives of with respect to i.
will be positive.  As a  result,  the sign  of the derivative in  (2) depends on the sign of the numerator. 
“Wage-led growth”,  understood as a  setting  in  which  falls in  the exogenous profit  share lead to 
higher levels of output relative to capacity, thus requires,
Ih[y,h] ! y d"w[" ]# d$c[$ ]( )           (3)
If the consumption  functions are linear,  the lower-bound condition in  (3) will  be expressed relative 
to the marginal  propensity  to consume of workers and that of capitalists. The condition for   may  be 
more generally expressed in relation to income elasticities, 11 
Ih[y,h] ! "#dwdw[# ]$"%dcdc[% ]          (4)
The relationship between  aggregate income distribution  and the level of economic activity  behind 
the “wage-led growth”  defined in  (4) is entirely  demand centered.  It  arises exclusively  as a  function 
of the responsiveness of demand by  workers relative to that of capitalists to changes in  their 
respective incomes. If the former is sufficiently  larger  than  the latter  to outweigh the positive effect 
of higher profit shares on investment, higher wage shares boost demand and capacity utilisation. 
The analytical  observation  upon  which  this paper  is founded is that  these results hinge on a 
limited,  if conventional understanding of the aggregate distribution  of income as an exogenous,  ex-
post sharing  of output.  Deliberate consideration  of the actual sequence and structure of class 
income flows in  capitalist reproduction quickly  reveals that, as emphasised by  Marxian  political 
economy,  wage and profit  flows arise from  fundamentally  different  moments of capitalist 
reproduction.  Wages are a part  of capital outlays by  enterprises,  which  fund purchases of non-
labour  inputs and the income flows of wage earners. Profits are the realisation  of mark-ups through 
sales supported by  aggregate demand. Once this structure is imposed onto analysis of expenditures 
and incomes, a  fundamentally  different  relationship between  income distribution, the level  of 
economic activity, and demand behaviour emerges. 
In  motivating  its results,  the paper  will first  make use of variations of the following static,  demand-
determined exercise, following  along  parallel  lines to the example above. All flows are measured in 
relation to existing  levels of productive and financial  stocks.  As above, suppose all  flows are 
measured relative to the full-capacity  level of output. In  contrast  to the approach above,  the 
sequenced structure of outlays in  capitalist reproduction  is imposed, using  the broad approach  and 
nomenclature of Foley’s (1982,  1986) formalisation of the Circuit  of Capital. Wages are taken as a 
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11 Where !i
x measures the elasticity of x with respect to i, according to the explicit relationship in question.
fraction  ! of capital outlays,  termed the composition of capital. Profits are taken as the realisation 
of a mark-up q on the production cost r of commodities sold. 
Along  conventional Marxian  lines,  the mark-up is given  by  q =!", where ! is the rate of 
exploitation, or  ratio between  paid and unpaid labour  time, taken  as determined through  point-of-
production and broader  socio-political struggles. In  this setting,  profits will be given by  qr. For 
simplicity,  suppose capital  outlays depend only  on  profit  flows.  In  the present, static  setting  this 
may  be interpreted as the simple supposition  that  the measure of capital outlays relative to 
productive capacities and to portfolio preferences will be conditioned by  contemporaneous 
profitability.  Supposing  for  now  that  the mark-up rate is constant, capital  outlays may  be simply 
depicted by z[r].Wage flows will thus be given by ! z[r].
It should be evident that both  the scale of economic activity  and the aggregate distribution  of 
income will  be  endogenous to the outlay  behaviour  of enterprises, capitalist  households,  and 
workers in  this setting.  Aggregate demand D will  fund sales at a  mark-up (1+ q) on  production 
costs, and will consist  of capitalist  demand for  non-labour  inputs plus demand for  consumption 
goods by  capitalists and workers.  The latter  are taken  to depend only  on  their  respective income 
flows,  with  all  parameters for  now  implicit  in  the relevant  consumption  functions.  All  of this yields 
the static identity of aggregate demand and sales,  
1+ q( )r = 1!"( )z r[ ] + dw z[r][ ] + dc r[ ]         (5a) 
In  this demand-determined exercise,  the cost-accounted level of sales r provides the central 
measure of the scale of output or economic activity. 
This framework poses a  number of differences in  relation  to more conventional Kaleckian 
approaches.  First, equation  (5a)  yields a  distinctive version of the identity  between investment and 
savings.  Supposingall profits are  paid to capitalist households,  savings are  given  by 
sc[r] = qr ! dc[r],  sw[z] =! z " dw[z], and (5a) may be stated as either,
1+ q( )r ! dc r[ ] + sw z[r][ ] = z r[ ]          (5b)
or
sc r[ ] + sw z[r][ ] = z r[ ]! r           (5c)
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Equation  (5b) is taken  to show  how  capital  outlays fund commensurate savings by  workers and by 
the aggregate capitalist  sector.  Note that  in  the present framework this identity  does not  require 
aggregate  commodity-market  equilibrium. As (5c) makes clear, it follows directly  from  the 
accounting identity requiring the change in financial surpluses by all sectors to add up to zero. 
Second, the condition  defining  stable evolutions in  this setting  will  be different  than  the 
conventional  Keynesian  condition.  Aggregate demand behaviour  will only  be stable relative to 
perturbations in  the level of sales if the derivative of total demand as given  in  (5a) does not  exceed 
the mark-up factor 1+ q( ).  Formally, the demand regime will be stable when,
!nl"r
z + !c"r
dc + !w"z
dw"r
z # 1           (6)
Where !nl , !c, and !w respectively  denote the shares in  total  demand 1+ q( )r of outlays for  non-
labour  inputs, consumption  by  capitalists,  and consumption  by  workers. Put  differently,  once the 
structure of outlays and incomes is considered, an evolution  will be stable only  when the income 
elasticities of outlays or  demand, weighted by  their  shares in  aggregate demand, average to no 
more than  unity. Note that  the condition does not preclude any  single elasticity  measure from 
exceeding  unity,  as long  as the others are sufficiently  low  to ensure (6) holds. While the results 
motivated in what  follows will typically  generalise for  non-stable evolutions,  the exposition will for 
simplicity be carried on the assumption that condition (6) is true. 
The aggregate distribution  of income will  also have a  distinctive expression in  this setting. It  will be 
given  by  the ratio of profits to wages,  and thus dependent on both  capital-outlay  and consumption 
decisions. Formally, it will be given by, 12
h[r] ! qr
" z[r] = #
r
z[r]            (7)
Alongside the accounting identity  in  (5),  this expression  for  the profit  share of output  supports 
three broad conclusions. 
First,  the aggregate distribution  of income may  be understood to be most generally  conditioned by 
the rate of exploitation, as emphasised by  Marxian contributions. As such,  it  will  be subject  to all 
the productive, labour-market,  and broader social conflicts determining  the division  of the working 
day  between paid and unpaid labour. While some of these determinations will be socio-political 
9
12 Note the last step in this expression hinges on commodity values being given by the present reproduction labour time.
and arguably  best understood as exogenous to the macroeconomic variables under  consideration 
here,  business-cycle variations in  labour-market conditions may  ensure this rate varies 
endogenously  alongside capital  outlays and other  variables.  Yet  even  if the rate of exploitation is 
taken as exogenous, the realised aggregate distribution  of income faces an  additional 
determination  in  the distinct  demand, financial, and entrepreneurial mediations conditioning 
consumption and capital outlays. 13 
Second, as both  the aggregate distribution  of income and the level  of output are endogenous to 
these outlays, both  measures will  have no mutual causal relationship. Changes to consumption  and 
capital-outlay  behaviour will  separately  effect changes on  the level of output  and on the balance of 
wage and profit income. The resulting associations between  the two measures will be confounded 
effects arising  from  underlying  changes to outlay  behaviour.  Different  changes affecting 
consumption and capital outlays will  generally  result  in  very  different  associations between  output 
and distribution. In this setting the concept of “wage-led growth” will have no analytical purchase. 
Third and finally,  in  the approach  articulated here, the relationship between consumption 
behaviour,  income distribution,  and output is fundamentally  different from  that  underpinning the 
“wage-led growth”  result  in  condition  (4). The aggregate distribution  of income is shaped by  the 
relative measure of sales to capital outlays, each  of which  conditions the other. Consumption 
decisions mediate the effect of capital  outlays on sales, so that  for  a  given  elasticity  of capital 
outlays relative to sales !r
z , the responsiveness of aggregate demand will be given by,
!r
D = "nl!r
z + "c!r
c + "w!z
w!r
z           (8)
As in  conventional approaches,  both  income elasticities of consumption  will  be positively  related 
with  aggregate demand and thus with output.  But two important  differences should be noted. First, 
the contribution of workers’ demand responsiveness to aggregate demand and output  is weighted 
by  the responsiveness of capital  outlays.  In  the present,  Marxian  framework,  the  reproduction  of 
workers is but  a  moment in the reproduction  of capital.  Their consumption cannot  generally  boost 
accumulation  beyond the commitment of capital value to production  that  funds wage payments.14 
Second, greater  responsiveness in  consumption  by  workers and capitalists boosts sales relative to 
capital outlays,  thus favouring  profit  shares in  total income. As is illustrated in  the next  two 
sections, these observations yield results concerning the composition of demand, output,  an 
distribution, that are unavailable on and oft counter to the bases of “wage-led growth”.
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13 This is in fact implicit in Circuitist approaches to the monetary circuits of capitalist reproduction. See Graziani (2003) 
and Lavoie (1992) for the canonical expositions of Italian and French Circuitism. 
14 The impact of consumption credit, which partially relaxes this statement, is taken up explicitly in section four.
3. Exploitation, Real Wage, Output and Distribution
The distinctive mechanisms shaping  the relationship between  consumption,  output,  and 
distribution in  the present  framework  may  be illustrated with  simple exercises along  the same lines 
of those offered by  the “wage-led growth”  literature. This  section  does so by  considering  the impact 
on  output  and distribution  of changes in  the rate of exploitation,  which  provides a  negative 
measure of the real wage. It also considers the impact  on  output of outright  redistributions of profit 
incomes in  favour  of wage earners.  These exercises yield results at  significant variance from  the 
“intuition”  derived from  conventional heterodox  approaches.  Notably,  attempts to change 
distribution via  increases in  real wages or  explicit  income redistribution  in  favour  of wage earners 
are shown possibly  to lead to “perverse”  results, including falls in  output and even falls in  the wage 
share of aggregate income. 
Consider  first  the rate of exploitation as an  exogenous parameter.  As long as the composition  of 
capital does not  change, movements in  that  rate may  be represented by  proportionate movements 
in  the mark-up rate. To consider  the impact  of such  changes, it  is necessary  to make explicit the 
dependences of outlays on incomes, and of profits on the mark-up rate,
1+ q( )r = 1!"( )z #[ ] + dw $[ ] + dc #[ ]         (9)
h[r,q] ! qr
" z[# ]            (10)
Where ! = ![r,q] = qr, and ! =![" , z[# ]] =" z[# ].
The relationship between the mark-up rate and the level of sales can be derived implicitly from (9),
dr
dq =
r !1+ 1!"( )z# [# ]+ d#c[# ]+"d$w[$ ]z# [# ]( )
1+ q( ) ! q 1!"( )z# [# ]+ d#c[# ]+"d$w[$ ]z# [# ]( )
      (11)
Along  stable evolutions the denominator  of (11)  is positive, ensuring the numerator  gives its sign  to 
the entire derivative.  The numerator  thus illustrates the two distinct effects set  into motion  by 
changes in  the rate of exploitation or  in  the mark-up rate.  First,  they  increase the level  of demand 
necessary  to realise surplus value in  produced output commodities.  As such  and ceteris  paribus, 
they  reduce the total  value of output  commodities realised for  any  given  level of demand. Second, 
greater  rates of exploitation  may  result in  greater  capital outlays,  which  fund greater  wage and 
sales flows,  boosting  consumption by  both  capitalists and workers. The net effect on  output  of 
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increases in  the rate of exploitation  will  follow  from  the balance of these two effects.  The rate of 
exploitation will be positively associated with levels of output as long as, 15 
q
1+ q( ) ! "nl#r
z + "c#r
dc + "w#z
dw#r
z          (12)
As in the “wage-led growth”  condition  given  by  (4),  the effect  of greater  rates of exploitation  on 
output  is ambiguous,  and hinges on  the income elasticities of consumption  and capital outlays.  In 
contrast  to the demand mechanism  underpinning  “wage-led growth”, the consumption  elasticities 
of workers and capitalists,  and that  of capital outlays by  capitalist enterprises, play  parallel roles in 
the determination of the net  resulting  effect,  with higher  values for all of them  making  a positive 
association  between the rate of exploitation  and output more likely.  Note that counter  to condition 
(4), this implies that  higher values for the income elasticity  of demand for  workers make it  less 
likely, ceteris paribus, that the association between the rate of exploitation and output is negative. 
A  further, counterintuitive result arises when  considering the impact of a change in  the rate of 
exploitation  on  the endogenous measure of aggregate  income distribution. This simple exercise 
points to the counterintuitive possibility  that  increases in  the rate of exploitation  lead to 
improvements  in  the wage share of total  income.  To see this,  start  from  the total  derivative of 
distribution with respect to the mark-up rate, 
dh[r,q]
dq !
"h[r,q]
"q +
"h[r,q]
"r
dr
dq          (13)
Presented explicitly this yields,
dh
dq =
r z[! ]" qrz
!
[! ]( )
z[! ]2 1+ q( ) " q 1"#( )z! [! ]+ d!c[! ]+#d$w[$ ]z! [! ]( )( )      (14)
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15 Since q 1+ q( )!1 < 1 for all  positive values for  the mark-up rate, there are stable  demand regimes, for  which condition 
(12) holds.        
Under stable demand regimes the denominator  of (14) is positive,  ensuring this derivative is 
negative whenever, !r
z > 1. 16 This requirement  is compatible  with  stable demand regimes as long  as 
the income elasticities of demand for consumption goods are sufficiently low so that,
!c"#
dc
1$ !nl + !w"%dw
<"r
z            (15)
In such  settings,  increases in  rates of exploitation  lead,  paradoxically, to falls in  the realised profit 
share of income. This may  arise even  when the increase in  the mark-up rate results in  an  increase 
in  aggregate demand and sales,  as long  as high  responsiveness of capital outlays is compensated by 
a sufficiently low responsiveness of consumption outlays, ensuring both (15) and (12) hold. 
Such counterintuitive results follow  from  the direct  dependence of profit  flows on aggregate 
demand,  and from  the dependence of wage flows on  capital outlays. These dependences will also 
shape the effect on  output of direct  attempts to affect  the realised distribution of income,  including 
through  outright  redistributive taxation, also yielding results at  variance with conventional 
“intuition”.  To see this,  consider a direct, lump-sum  tax  on  profits that  is paid out  in toto  to wage 
earners. The net  income of capitalists and workers will be respectively  given  by,  nc = qr !",  and 
nw = kz nc[ ] +!.   
In this setting, the aggregate-demand condition becomes, 
1+ q( )r = 1!"( )z nc[ ] + dw nw[ ] + dc nc[ ]         (16)
The aggregate distribution of income, accounting for the redistribution, becomes,
h r,![ ] = ncnw
=
qr "!
# z[nc ]+!
          (17)
The impact  of changes in  the level of lump-sum  redistribution  on  the level  of output is implicitly 
given by (16), from which it is possible to obtain,
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16 Note that  if  this elasticity  is equal  to unity  the derivative in (14) is zero. This will  always be the case in any  setting where 
production responds commensurately  and instantaneously  to demand, as in  the standard Kaleckian scenario. In  such 
cases there is no practical  distinction between purchasing and production decisions, and the determinations of 
distribution considered by this paper and leading to (14) do not arise. 
dr
d! =
dnww nw[ ]n!w " dncc nc[ ]+ 1"#( )znc nc[ ]( )
1+ q( ) " q dncc nc[ ]+ 1"#( )znc nc[ ] +#dnww nw[ ]znc nc[ ]( )
     (18)
Where n!w = 1"# znc[nc ] is the derivative of aggregate wage income with respect to !.  
Considering only  stable demand regimes,  under  which  the denominator of (18)  will be positive, 
comparative-static increases in lump-sum redistribution result in greater levels of output when,
dnww nw[ ]n!w " dncc nc[ ] > 1"#( )znc nc[ ]          (19)
Note that since n!w " 1,  this is a  much  stronger requirement  on the consumption  propensities of 
wage earners than  that imposed by  the conventional  “wage-led growth”  requirement  in  (4). 
Inasmuch  as the lump-sum  tax on  profits reduces private capital  outlays, it  will also reduce 
aggregate  wage flows, ceteris paribus.  This will undermine any  positive effect  on  aggregate demand 
following  from  high consumption propensities by  wage earners. It  is even  conceivable  that  high 
labour  intensity  and very  responsive capital outlays may  ensure n!w < 0,  implying  comparative-
static lump-sum  redistributions result in  lower  aggregate wage flows,  and that (19) never holds. 
Discounting such cases and considering only  settings where n!w > 0, increases in  the lump-sum  tax 
will result in  greater  levels of output  when workers’ income elasticity  of demand is sufficiently 
strong to ensure,
!nc
dw >
"nl!nc
z + "c!nc
dc
h r,#[ ]"wn#w
           (20)
It is important to note explicitly  that  these results demonstrate how  the framework advanced by 
the paper  allows for  integrated consideration  of the two distinct  processes typically  highlighted by 
opposing  sides in  policy  debates concerning  the desirability  of redistributions of income: The 
posited gains arising from  greater  consumption  propensities of wage earners,  and the posited 
losses arising from  the negative effects of redistributive taxation  on  capital outlays,  employment, 
and thus aggregate wages themselves.  The paper  returns to this and broader policy  considerations 
after the consideration of the germane exercises offered in the next section. 
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4. Capital Outlays, Workers’ Consumption and the Endogeneity of Distribution
This section  turns to two additional exercises that help lay  out the determination  of income 
distribution the paper is emphasising,  illustrate the confounded character  of associations between 
distribution and output  in  any  demand-determined setting,  and establish  the argument for 
investment-led growth as an  alternative macroeconomic  programme that  meets the aims of 
proponents of “wage-led growth” while avoiding its analytical pitfalls.  It  does so by  considering  the 
impact  on  distribution  of independent,  exogenous increases to capital  outlays and to consumption 
by  workers. Under  generally  plausible conditions they  each  lead to opposing  movements in  the 
aggregate distribution of income, even while jointly boosting demand and the level of output. 
Formally,  consider  a  simple generalisation  of the framework above. Let capital  outlays and 
workers’ consumption  each  depend positively  on  additional parameters ! and ! respectively. 
These two parameters may  stand for anything autonomously  boosting  capital outlays and 
consumption by  workers.  Here they  will  be referred to as respective measures of leverage boosting 
those expenditure flows,  but they  may  be, for  instance,  deficit  government  outlays initiating 
investment projects or financing sales of output. Total sales will then be given by,
1+ q( )r = 1!"( )z r,#[ ] + dw z[r,#],$[ ] + dc r[ ]        (22)
This implicitly  defines sales as an  endogenous function  of the leverage parameters and outlay 
functions, so that for a given specification of the latter, r = r[!,"].  Income distribution will be,
h[!,"] # qr[!,"]
$ z[r,!]            (23)
Consider  now  movements in  the leverage parameters.  It  should be obvious that  greater  leverage in 
outlays will boost sales and output,  irrespective of the outlay  in  question.  Yet  they  can  be shown to 
have very  different effects on  the aggregate distribution  of income under  generally  plausible 
conditions. Consumption credit  will  generally  increase profit  shares in  aggregate income,  while 
production credit will  generally  increase wage shares.17 This is a  significant  finding  concerning the 
macroeconomic content  of different credit allocations in its own right. It  also illustrates the 
determination  of income distribution emphasised by  the present  paper, and attests to the 
difficulties posed when considering  the relationship between two endogenous variables.  Different 
15
17 A dynamic version of this finding, posed in the terms of the original, continuous-time formalisation of the Circuit of 
Capital offered by Foley (1982, 1986), is offered in dos Santos (2013). 
parameter  shifts,  in  this case in  the measures of leverage supporting  consumption  by  workers or 
capital outlays, lead to different associations between the profit-share and the level of output. 
Formally, an increase in leverage in capital outlays would change distribution according to,
dh[!,"]
d! #
$h[!,"]
$!
+
$h[!,"]
$r
dr
d!          (24)
Obtaining the necessary derivatives from (22) and (23) yields,
dh[!,"]
d! =
qz![r,!] r 1+ q( ) # drc[r]( ) # z[r,!] 1#$( ) + dzw z[r,!],"[ ]( )( )
#$ z[r,!]2 1+ q( ) # drc[r]+ zr[r,!] 1#$( ) + dzw z[r,!],"[ ]( )( )( )     (25)
The term  inside the parentheses in  the denominator  of (25)  is the derivative of the definition  of 
aggregate  sales given  by  (22),  expressed as an  excess supply, with  respect to the level of sales. 
Stability  requires that  it  be positive.  Since by  hypothesis z![r,!] > 0, the sign  of the derivative in 
(25) will be negative as long as,
1+ q( )r ! 1!"( )z[r,#] > rdrc[r]+ z[r,#]dzw z[r,#],$[ ]       (26)
Using  the fact  that the left-hand side in  (26) is the demand for  consumption  goods,  and expressing 
the relationship in  terms of income elasticities of demand,  it  is evident that,  the profit share will be 
falling on the measure of production credit whenever,
 !z
dw dw z[r,"],#[ ]
dw z[r,"],#[ ] + dc r[ ] +!r
dc dc r[ ]
dw z[r,"],#[ ] + dc r[ ] < 1        (27)
In words, the impact  of production credit (or  anything  directly  boosting  only  capital outlays) on 
income distribution depends on  the weighted-average responsiveness of demand for  consumption 
goods by  all households.  If the average income elasticity  of demand is smaller  than  unity, greater 
paces of production  credit  will improve wage shares, as their  impact  on  wages will proportionately 
exceed their  impact on  sales and profits.  Condition  (27) is plausible and met  formally  in  any  setting 
where marginal consumption propensities fall on income. 
Consider along similar lines consumption credit. The corresponding derivative of distribution is,
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dh[!,"]
d" =
qd"w z[r,!],"[ ] z[r,!]# rzr[r,!]( )
$ z[r,!]2 1+ q( ) # drc[r]+ zr[r,!] 1#$( ) + dzw z[r,!],"[ ]( )( )( )     (28)
Following  the same line of reasoning  as above,  consumption  credit  will improve the profit  share as 
long as the numerator is positive. Expressed in relation to elasticities, the requirement is, simply, 
!r
z < 1              (29)
The impact  of consumption  credit  on the aggregate distribution  of income will  hinge on  the 
responsiveness of capital outlays to increases in sales consequent  to the debt-supported increase in 
worker  outlays. As long as increases in  capital  outlays are proportionately  smaller  than  those in 
sales, consumption credit will increase the profit share of aggregate income. 
Conditions (27) and (29) identify  the settings in  which  production  and consumption  credit 
respectively  increase and decrease the wage share in  aggregate income. The limits on outlay 
responsiveness they  contain  will also ensure that  the demand-stability  requirement  in  (6) is met. 
In  fact,  it  should be evident  that  under  stable demand regimes, at  least  one of these two conditions 
must  hold along any  stable evolution. It  should be reasonable to expect  to find many  instances in 
which  both  conditions hold,  and where each  credit  allocation  yields opposite effects on  the 
aggregate distribution of income. 
These results are interesting  in  their  own right,  especially  in light  of the significant recent 
reorientation  of bank  credit  in  favour  of consumption  and mortgage loans (which  may  indirectly 
support  consumption) across a  range of advanced and middle-income economies. They  also 
illustrate well  the difficulties posed when considering  the relationship between  two jointly-
determined variables.  Under  conditions (27)  and (29), the confounded relationship between  output 
and income distribution  has opposite  signs.  The issue of recasting  analysis of the relationship 
between  distribution  and growth  under  this light is taken up in  the next section, which  offers an 
alternative taxonomy  based on  the the effects any  given  parameter  movement in  any  dynamic 
model of accumulation has on each one of these two measures. 
Before  proceeding  to that  discussion,  it should be noted that  these findings also point to an 
alternative, broader  macroeconomic policy  agenda  to that  posed by  “wage-led growth”.  They 
evidently  imply  that  any  given  development  or policy  intervention helps shape income distribution 
not only  through  its impact on  the real wage,  but also through  its relative impact  on capital and 
consumption outlays. In  conjunction  with  the results in  section  three, this provides broader  bases 
on  which  to assess the role of any  given  policy  measure or  broader development on  growth  and 
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distribution than  an  exclusive focus on real  wages. For  instance, consumption-led growth 
strategies,  such as those recently  pursued across a  range of economies through  the promotion  of 
asset-price inflation, wealth  effects, and consumption credit, will be  expected to contribute to 
increases in profit shares, even if unaccompanied be falls in real wages.  
Conversely, growth  strategies focussed on  boosting relative levels of investment  undertakings 
should be expected to result in  higher  wage shares,  as long as real wages are not  simultaneously 
falling.  Successful investment-led growth strategies along these lines may  deliver  the combination 
of improvements in  the aggregate  conditions of wage earners and improvements in  positive 
measures of economic  performance sought by  proponents of “wage-led growth”.  Yet  consideration 
of investment-led strategies begs broader  and more ambitious macroeconomic policy  agendas.  It 
naturally  poses questions of institutional and policy  settings most conducive to the requisite high 
paces of investment.  Particularly  in  settings of low  responsiveness of private investment, or  of high 
or  rising  real wages,  this poses debates concerning the relative merits and possible roles of private 
and public enterprises in underpinning more equitable patterns of high economic growth.
5. A Few Pertinent Dynamic Considerations
The exercises above have been  founded on  a simple but static framework. While sufficient  to 
motivate the analytical caveats outlined above, this offers no means to account  for  the evolution  of 
stocks that are codetermined with the flows under  consideration  and that  shape aggregate 
profitability: inventories,  engaged inputs,  fixed capital,  financial assets and liabilities,  existing and 
potential supplies of labour  power,  etc.  Significantly,  the relationship between  capital outlays and 
aggregate  demand shown  above to shape the aggregate distribution  of income also drives the 
evolution  of the stock of total capital value committed by  enterprises to the production of 
commodities.  That  stock,  in  turn, shapes aggregate profitability, and the relative measure of its 
components may shape enterprise behaviour.  
Deliberate consideration  of flows and the evolution  of all  stocks in  the economy  requires explicitly 
dynamic  approaches, which  also permit  consideration  of the determinants of growth rates  proper. 
This section  briefly  frames the points developed above in  relation  to trend rates of growth  for  any 
dynamic  macroeconomic model  offering  explicit  consideration  of the formation of aggregate 
demand and of aggregate capital outlays. It does so by  considering  the distinctly  dynamic 
determinants of the  aggregate distribution of income along  the underlying exponential  trend of any 
given  economic evolution.  On that  basis it  offers an  alternative taxonomy  for  characterising  the 
relationship between class income shares, outlays, and the rate of growth. 
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Consider  a  dynamic evolution  for  a capitalist  economy’s stocks and flows containing  a real 
exponential trend. Suppose further  that  this trend mode of evolution  is stable, and that  its rate of 
growth  is a  continuous,  differentiable function  g = g[
!x] of the parameters of the system  of 
equations  modeling the economy. 18  Under  any  given  normalisation, the extensive evolution  of any 
stock or flow will be given by,19 
 Yt = Y0
!x,g[ !x][ ]eg[ !x ]t            (30)
In this setting, any  weighted ratio between flows and stocks in  the economy,  such  as the aggregate 
distribution of income or  the rate of profit,  may  be understood as a  function  of the parameters and 
the rate of growth,
 
A !x,g[ !x][ ] = ! !x[ ]Y0
i !x,g[ !x][ ]
Y0j
!x,g[ !x][ ]          (31)
With  minimal loss of generality, consider  a  ratio where the autonomous term  is itself a parameter, 
independent of all others, such as the distribution of income, for constant rates of exploitation. 
 
H !x,g[ !x][ ] = ! R0
!x,g[ !x][ ]
Z0
!x,g[ !x][ ]           (32)
The points developed in  previous sections may  may  be restated and generalised on  the basis of this 
identification. Both  the trend rate of growth  and any  ratio like (32),  including  the aggregate 
distribution of income, are taken  as endogenous to the parameters. Any  comparative-dynamic 
change in  the parameters will independently  condition  the growth  rate and income distribution.  In 
order  to consider  the consequent confounded association  between  both variables it  is necessary  to 
characterise the impact of parameter changes on this measure of aggregate distribution. 
19
18 For  extensive formulations of  linear  systems of  differential  equations, this amounts to consideration of the mode of 
evolution defined by  a real  eigenvalue of  the system’s Jacobian matrix, and by  initial  conditions given by  the 
corresponding eigenvector. This evolution will  be  stable when this eigenvalue has the largest real  part  of all  eigenvalues 
for  the system. Both the  eigenvalue and the elements of  the  corresponding eigenvector  may  be understood as functions of 
the parameters defining the  Jacobian matrix. Linear  systems of  integral  equations--such as those used in Foley  (1982, 
1986)--implicitly  define unique exponential  rates of  growth as functions of  their  parameters, and eigenvectors of 
corresponding initial conditions.  
19  The explicit  dependence of  the trend exponential  rate of growth is warranted for  three reasons. First, under  real 
exponential  evolutions the rate  of  growth will  appear  in ratios between initial  conditions whenever  some variables 
depend directly  on past  variables. This is the case with stocks as well  as any  flows subject  to lagged dependences on past 
flows. Second, it  may  not  be  possible  to express explicitly  the rate of  growth  as a function of parameters, as under  even 
simple settings, the equations defining these relationships may  involve transcendental  functions, high-degree 
polynomials, or  other  nonlinearities. In such cases comparative-dynamic exercises may  be  pursued with  the help of  the 
Implicit  Function Theorem. And third, these explicit  dependences are  necessary  to consider  the determinants of 
distribution and growth rates.
Consider a movement along a parameter xi , which changes distribution according to,
 
dH !x,g[ !x][ ]
dxi
= Hi
!x,g[ !x][ ] + dg
!x[ ]
dxi
Hg
!x,g[ !x][ ]        (33)
Where the subscript i on any  variable denotes its partial derivative with  respect  to xi . This may  be 
expressed in relation to elasticities,
!i
H = " !i
R0 #!i
Z0( ) +!ig !gR0 #!gZ0( ){ }         (34)
The first difference in  (34)  captures the static  or  contemporaneous effects of parameter  changes on 
distribution,  and is the broadest  foundation  for  all the results motivated so far.  The second 
difference captures a  further,  dynamic element  in  the reaction  of income distribution. Inasmuch  as 
parameter  changes alter  the steady-state rate of growth,  any  differences in  the measure to which 
capital outlays and aggregate sales depend respectively  on past  flows will  give  rise  to additional 
dynamic  effects changing  the distribution  of income.  Significantly,  it  is possible that  exogenous 
shifts will have contemporaneous, static  effects that  are offset or  reversed by  their  dynamic impact 
on  capital  outlays and sales via  the rate  of growth. This may  be an  additional  source of 
counterintuitive or seemingly paradoxical dynamic effects along the lines discussed above. 
It is now  possible to turn  to the confounded relationship between  growth  and aggregate income 
distribution for  any  arbitrary  exogenous change to a  model’s parameters.  Consider  a  movement 
along  a  (normalised) direction   
!
! = !1,!2 ,...,!n[ ] in  parameter  space,  corresponding  to proportional 
parameter  changes  
!
! ! 1,! 2 ,...,! n[ ]. The confounded association between  distribution  and growth 
will be given by  the total derivative of distribution along direction  
!
! , divided by  the same 
directional derivative for the rate of growth,
 
dH !x,g[ !x][ ]
dg !!  
=
!
! .
!
"H !x,g[ !x][ ]!
! .
!
"g !x[ ]
         (35)
This is more intuitively expressed as a relationship on the directional elasticity of distribution, 
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!g
H
!
"
= !g
R0 #!g
Z0( ) + !i
R0 #!i
Z0( )$ i%
!i
g$ i%
        (36)
Any  observed association  between distribution  and growth  in  the present  context arises from  the 
balance of the distinct  influences of parameter  shifts on capital  outlays and on  aggregate demand. 
These include dynamic effects arising  from  the impact of parameter  shifts on  the rate of growth. It 
should be evident  that  different  parameter-change vectors will result in  a  different confounded 
elasticity. There is no single relationship between distribution and growth in any given economy. 
While  the directional  elasticity  in  (36) does not  reflect  a  causal association  between  the aggregate 
distribution of income and the economy’s rate of growth,  it  does provide the basis for  specific 
statements considering  the association  between  the two measures along  any  comparative dynamic 
movement  in a given  direction  in  parameter  space.  A  movement along any  such  direction  may  be 
said to result in  a profit-share boosting acceleration if the elasticity  in  (36) is unambiguously 
positive along steady-state evolutions.  Conversely, wage-share boosting accelerations will  result 
from movements along directions for which this elasticity is negative. 
To illustrate these concepts,  consider an  exercise similar  to that undertaken in  section  four. 
Suppose the system  in  question  includes two parameters,  ! and !, which  directly  boost  capital 
outlays and consumption  by  workers respectively. In  any  demand-constrained framework,  both 
parameters will boost  the steady-state rate of exponential  growth.  Application of (36) shows that  an 
increase in ! will increase the wage share while supporting a growth acceleration when, 
!"
g !g
Z0 #!g
R0( ) > !"R0 #!"Z0( )           (37)
Conversely, an increase in ! will result in profit-share increases during an acceleration if,
!"
g !g
R0 #!g
Z0( ) > !"Z0 #!"R0( )           (38)
Inequalities (37) and (38)  are dynamic  generalisations of conditions (27) and (29).20 The net effect 
on  the aggregate distribution of income of either  type of credit  will depend on  the relative, 
contemporaneous effect it  has on  capital outlays relative to sales.  It will also depend, inasmuch  as 
the determinations of capital outlays and sales are subject  to time lags,  on  the dynamic effect 
21
20 In the absence of dynamic effects, the left-hand sides of (37) and (38) become zero, and the inequalities effectively 
resolve into statements of (27) and (29), which can be seen easily if the normalisations pursued below are followed. 
greater  lending has on  the rate of growth. The conditions ensuring  both  inequalities hold may  be 
broadly motivated.  
In  considering  (37),  suppose the steady-state solutions to the system  are normalised to the level of 
capital outlays, ensuring  its elasticities are zero and that  sales are measured relative to it. Inasmuch 
as sales follow  with some time lags from  capital outlays,  the left-hand side of that inequality  will be 
positive,  as greater  growth  reduces sales relative to contemporaneous capital outlays.  Condition 
(37)  will  only  fail to hold if production credit  leads to increases in  sales relative to capital outlays, 
and if the resulting elasticity  is sufficiently  large  to outweigh  dynamic effects arising from  lags in 
sales relative to capital  outlays. Conversely, consider  (38) while normalising  solutions to the level 
of sales.  As above, the left  hand side of the inequality  will be positive as long as capital outlays have 
some dependence on  lagged values of sales.  The condition  will only  fail  to hold if consumption 
credit has a  positive impact  on capital outlays relative to sales,  and that  impact  is sufficiently  large 
to outweigh dynamic effects reducing capital outlays relative to sales. 
Given  the strength  of these requirements, one should expect to find many  dynamic specifications 
under which  both  (37) and (38) hold. In those cases, production  credit effects wage-share boosting 
accelerations,  while consumption  credit  would effect  profit-boosting growth  accelerations.  A new 
taxonomy  along  these lines is admittedly  more cumbersome and less “intuitive”  than  conventional 
arguments in  favour  of better  wage shares based on  their  putative impact  on  growth.  But  it  is also 
less facile, and avoids the analytical problems associated with “wage-led growth”. 
6. By Way of Conclusion: Situating and Motivating the Framework
This paper has presented a  distinctive and hitherto neglected determinant  of the aggregate,  class 
distribution of income, operating  over any  time horizon  in  which  aggregate demand and the 
commitment  of value to production  are determined with  a  measure  of mutual  autonomy.  This 
determinant  operates as a  consequence of the fact that  wages and profits pertain  to different 
moments in  the reproduction  of capital.  Wages are a  share of capital  outlays.  Profits represent a 
share of total commodity  sales funded by  aggregate demand.  The class distribution  of income is 
consequently  shaped by  the relationship between  production  and consumption  decisions.  In  these 
settings,  income distribution  and levels of output are jointly  determined by  the same processes. 
This observation leads to a flat rejection of the analytical and policy purchase of “wage-led growth”.
The deliberate  consideration  of the relationship between capital outlays and aggregate demand also 
gives rise to broader  differences with  the Kaleckian  (or  Steindlian)  approaches to income 
distribution,  profitability  and growth  sustaining arguments for  “wage-led growth”.21  At  the 
22
21 Such as those in Rowthorn (1981), Dutt (1984), Taylor (1985), and Lavoie (1995), for instance. 
broadest  level these differences follow  from  the manner  in  which  the rejection  of Say’s Law  is given 
operational  form  in  those contributions: All output  is taken  to be sold upon  production,  but 
demand determines the rates at  which  existing  productive capacities,  taken  as constant  over  the 
time horizons under  consideration,  are utilised.  While manifestly  useful across a  range of analytical 
applications, this approach  does not  permit  consideration of the interplay  between  production  and 
consumption decisions that  helps condition  growth, distribution, and profitability,  over  at  least 
some time horizons. 
The assumption  that  all output  is sold upon  production  is shared with  neoclassical  approaches.  In 
any  such  setting  the distribution of income between  profits and wages will appear  to be reducible to 
a  sharing  of the value of output.  Distribution will  consequently  be understood to hinge only  on 
technological considerations governing  factor  employment levels,  and on  the evolution  of the real 
wage. 22  The exercises above can  accommodate models offering  endogenous accounts of 
technological change and of the evolution of the real wage,23 and their  impact  on  distribution. But 
they  point  to the additional role in  shaping distribution  played by  the dynamic interaction  between 
decisions to commit value to production and decisions to purchase inputs or consumption goods. 
In  any  stock-flow  consistent framework, recognition  of the distinction  between production  and 
purchasing  decisions  necessarily  implies that stocks capital  value engaged as productive resources 
and inventories are dynamically  evolving. Capital  outlays add to stocks of engaged productive 
resources, while the completion  of output  drains them. Finished output  commodities add to 
inventory  stocks,  while sales funded by  aggregate demand drain  them. Measuring  inventories at 
production cost, and letting Pt denote output flows, these evolutions are given formally by,24
 
!
t = Zt " Pt             (39)
 
!Nt = Pt ! Rt             (40)
The stock of capital is given by the sum of engaged productive resources and inventories and obeys,
23
22 Under neoclassical “perfect competition”, in fact, if aggregate output is understood as given by a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, factor shares in the value of output will independent of factor prices and exclusively determined by 
“technology”; specifically, by the corresponding Cobb-Douglas exponent or factor-employment elasticity of output. In any  
labour-cost mark-up approach to price, the relevant technological consideration will be the labour-to-output ratio, given 
here by the composition of capital.  
23 Including along the lines of  Taylor’s (1985) specification of  the evolution of wages and commodity  prices, or, if  broader 
consideration is given  to the  evolution of  overall  labour supply, along the lines of  the Philips-Curve mechanism used by 
Goodwin (1967). 
24 In line with Foley (1982, 1986). See also dos Santos (2013).
 
!Kt = Zt ! Rt             (41)
The evolution of the aggregate stock of capital is thus determined by  the entire history  of capital 
outlays and aggregate demand.25 As a  result,  the rate of profit  on  aggregate capital is shaped by  the 
same productive and consumption  decisions conditioning  the distribution  of income. In  fact,  along 
the trend, exponential evolutions considered in  section  five, profitability  may  be expressed in 
relation to the profit share, the rate of growth, and a model’s parameters,
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In the present setting, the comparative-dynamic  relationships between profitability,  growth, and 
the profit  share are also confounded. The relationship in  (42)  opens the possibility  of parameter 
movements under  which  profitability  may  exhibit negative associations with  either  the rate of 
growth  or the profit share.  This may  arise, for  instance, when parameter  movements not  involving 
the rate of exploitation  or the composition  of capital  result  in negative associations between  growth 
and profit shares. 
This explicit  account of the evolution of aggregate capital  stocks points to the context  in  which  rates 
of capacity  utilisation  condition  profitability. If the rate of capacity  utilisation is taken  as 
proportional to the ratio of output  flows to the total stock of mobilised productive resources, 
greater  measures of utilisation  will see comparatively  smaller  stocks of productive resources.  Note 
however  that  as evident  from  (41),  this will  not  be sufficient  to ensure reductions in  total stocks of 
capital value,  which  will only  follow  from  the actual  sale  of commodities.  As such, greater  rates of 
capacity  utilisation  will not in  themselves boost  profitability.  They  will  do so only  when 
accompanied (or driven by) greater paces of demand. 
These brief considerations help identify  the distinctive analytical  purchase of the framework 
sustaining  the discussions presented by  this paper. They  also suggest directions in  which  Kaleckian 
models of income distribution, growth,  and profitability  in  demand-determined settings may  be 
developed so as to account  for  the processes shaping  income distribution this paper has identified. 
This paper  may  be most usefully  concluded with  a motivation  of why  such an  enterprise  may  have 
significant empirical and policy purchase in relation to contemporary capitalism. 
At the broadest level the approach  to income distribution developed here suggests that  income 
shares are determined not  only  by  the real wage and levels of employment, but  also by  the measure 
24
25 Assuming no difference between historical and replacement costs of mobilised productive resources.
of aggregate demand for  inputs and consumption  goods relative to the capital outlays of 
enterprises. This emphasis affords a  distinct  perspective on  the impact  of the “consumption-led 
growth” strategies that  have been pursued in  the US, British, and a  range of upper-middle-income 
economies in  recent years. States have pursued increases in  the relative measure of consumption 
by  wage earners through  the promotion of asset-price appreciations associated with  wealth-effects 
on  expenditure, as well  as through encouragement  of outright  borrowing  by  wage earners.  Private 
financial intermediaries have helped the process along  by  developing  profitable  business segments 
in credit-card, broader consumption, and mortgage loans in this period.26 
These developments resulted in  dramatic  falls in  savings rates in  the US and British  economies in 
the years leading  up to the 2008.27  Absolute increases in  consumption were manifestly  not 
matched by  increases in  capital outlays, private or  public.  Consumption  expenditures rose from 
accounting  respectively  for  63  and 53  percent  of GDP in  1977,  to 70  and 65  percent  in 2009.28 
According  to the framework advanced by  this paper,  the “consumption-led growth”  strategies 
contributing  to these developments will have directly  contributed to increases in  profit  shares of 
aggregate  income. The contribution  put  forward by  this paper  may  be thus taken  in  support  further 
work  concerning  the relationship between  demand,  investment,  and growth  in  contemporary 
economies,  and of policy  arguments in  favour of alternative,  investment-led growth  strategies that 
simultaneously boost growth and labour shares in aggregate income. 
25
26 See dos Santos (2009).
27 Savings rates fell from about 10 and 14 percent in the US and Britain respectively in early 1980, to pre-crisis lows of 2 
and 0.9 in late 2007/early 2008.  Data is available from the US Federal Reserve and UK Office for National Statistics. 
28 Calculated from US Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bank of England Data.
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Figure 1 | US Manufacturing and Trade Inventories To Sales Ratio
January 1992 - January 2013, Source: US Census Bureau
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Figure 2 | US Manufacturing and Trade Inventories To GDP
1992Q1 - 2012Q4, Calculated from BEA and US Census Bureau Data29
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29 Census Bureau monthly data on inventories is averaged over the relevant quarter.
